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RECENT DECISIONS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-LMITATIONS ON USE OF BLOOD GRoup-

recent cases in
the federal district court of New York, petitioners sought admission
to the United States on the basis of derivative citizenship, and were
given a hearing before the Board of Special Inquiry.' The Board,
in each instance, denied them admission upon a finding that the petitioners could not be the children of their purported parents, the sole
evidence supporting these findings consisting of the interpretation of
the results of blood tests. In both cases, the court sustained a writ
of habeas corpus unless a rehearing be conducted within twenty days.
The court, in United States ex rel. Lee Kum Hoy v. Shaughnessy,2
held that failure to permit relators to examine the qualifications of
those who administered the tests constituted a denial of due process.
In United States ex rel. Dong Wing Ott v. Shaughnessy,3 the court
held that a finding based on hearsay evidence alone is invalid when
corroborative evidence is "conveniently available."
Since its perfection in 1924, 4 the science of blood grouping has
had a turbulent history in the field of law. The introduction of blood
grouping results as evidence has been looked upon favorably by the
European courts,5 but has not met with judicial approval in the United
States. While some jurisdictions will not compel the parties to submit to such tests, 6 the majority merely refuse to consider the evidentiary facts established by them as conclusive.7 However, in recent
years, several states, recognizing the value of such
evidence, have
8
enacted appropriate legislation to facilitate its use.
Prior to the instant proceedings, the federal courts had been
called on to consider the use of blood grouping tests in only one inING TESTS IN IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS.-In two

' Applicants claimed United States citizenship pursuant to REv. STAT. § 1993
as children of American citizens. See 10 STAT. 604 (1855), as amended,
48 STAT. 797 (1934).
2 115 F. Supp. 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
3 116 F. Supp. 745 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
4See Flacks, Evidential Value of Blood Tests to Prove Non-Paternity,
21 A.B.A.J. 680, 681 (1935).
5 See Matter of Swahn, 158 Misc. 17, 19, 285 N.Y. Supp. 234, 236 (Surr.
Ct. 1936) ; Flacks, supra note 4, at 681.
s See, e.g., Commonwealth v. English, 123 Pa. Super. 161, 186 At. 298, 301
(1936); Commonwealth v. Krutsick, 151 Pa. Super. 164, 30 A2d 325, 326
(1943).
7 See, e.g., Arais v. Kalensikoff, 10 Cal. 2d 428, 74 P.2d 1043 (1937);
State ex rel. Slovak v. Holod, 63 Ohio App. 16, 24 N.E2d 962 (1939).
8 See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRA.c. Acr § 306-a; N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, §§ 2:99-3,
2:99-4 (Supp. 1951) ; OHio IEv. CODE ANN. tit. 23, § 2317.47 (Baldwin, 1953);
Wis. STAT. §§ 166.105, 325.23 (1951).
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stance. In that case, a paternity action, the court ruled that such
evidence should be received, and indicated that, under certain circumstances, the results should be conclusive.9
I
The Lee Kum Hoy case deals with the question as to the constitutional limitations to be placed on the use of the results of such tests
in administrative proceedings. The court intimated that it would
have been proper for the Immigration Department to have given the
results of the blood tests conclusive effect in resolving the question of
disputed parentage. The court, however, was not required to pass
upon the sufficiency of this evidence as it decided that the relators
should have been afforded the opportunity to cross-examine those who
administered the tests. In so requiring, the court followed sound
legal precedent. In 1949, the Supreme Court of the United States
held in Reilly v. Pinkus 10 that medical evidence introduced in an administrative hearing must be made subject to cross-examination, and
reversed an administrative order based on such evidence where crossexamination was denied. The net result of such cases would seem
to be that although legally incompetent evidence may be admitted
before an administrative body, the party against whom it is presented
must be accorded the right, inherent in our system of jurisprudence,
to controvert that evidence by cross-examination. Such a procedure
is only in keeping with the "fair hearing" concept governing all administrative proceedings."
II
In the Dong Wing Ott case, on the other hand, the relators were
afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the physician who generally
supervised, but did not himself conduct, the tests. Furthermore, the
applicants failed to object to the admission of the blood tests into
evidence. Therefore, the problem in this case differs from that of
the Lee Kum Hoy case in that here the court was concerned with the
question of whether the Immigration Department was correct in
basing its decisions exclusively upon the interpretation of the results
of blood tests, such evidence being hearsay. It is well established,
both by statute 12 and case law,"3 that administrative tribunals are not
9

See Beach v. Beach, 114 F.2d 479, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1940).

10338 U.S. 269 (1949).

21 See Powhatan Mining Co. v. Ickes, 118 F.2d 105 (1941).
= The Administrative Procedure Act provides that "[a]ny oral or documentary evidence may be received. .. ." The only qualification is that %.. every
agency shall as a matter of policy provide for the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence .... ." 60 STAT. 241, 5 U.S.C. § 1006(c)

(1946).

13See ICC v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 44 (1904).
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bound by the strict judicial rules regarding the admissibility of evidence. Not so well settled, however, are the questions: How much
weight is to be accorded to this evidence and, further, may a decision
be based exclusively on it? Congress, in enacting the Administrative
Procedure Act,14 left these questions unanswered when they provided
that the findings must be "... supported by and in accordance with
the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence." A study of case
law on the question leads only to uncertainty and confusion. Some
states 15 follow New York's viewpoint and have adopted the "residuum
rule." "I Under this rule, there must be some legal evidence to support that which is incompetent. On the other hand, Judge Learned
Hand, of the federal court of appeals, has formulated another test
which permits an administrative agency to base its decision exclusively on hearsay. However, this evidence must be of the type
upon which "responsible persons are accustomed to rely in serious
affairs," and is sufficient only if other evidence is not "conveniently
available." 17
The court, wisely adopting Judge Hand's rule, stated that while
a treatise concerning the interpretation of blood tests may properly
be considered as "the kind of evidence upon which responsible persons
are accustomed to rely in serious affairs," it fails to meet the "conveniently available" safeguard. Here again, the court infers that it
would have been proper for the Immigration Department to have given
the results of the blood tests conclusive effect had there been some
other legally competent corroborative evidence.
The court in the Dong Wing Ott case, with respect to Chinese
applicants, revealed startling statistics clearly indicating the prevalence
of fraud.' Since many of the fraudulent applicants are well rehearsed,
and since the Immigration Department's information regarding China
is meager, it is difficult to detect such deceit. The use of blood tests,
however, has proven so invaluable in combating this fraud that it
should not be unduly restricted by the courts. The approval of such
evidence by the courts in the above-mentioned cases, and in several
14 See note 12 supra.
16*See, e.g., Lloyd-McAlpine Logging Co. v. Whitefish, 188 Wis. 642, 206

N.W. 914 (1926).

16 See Matter of Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 218 N.Y. 435, 440, 113

N.E. 507, 509 (1916). But cf. Altschuller v. Bressler, 289 N.Y. 463, 46 N.E.2d
886 (1943).
'17See NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F.2d 862, 873 (2d Cir.), cert.
de ied, 304 U.S. 576 (1938).
Is The court recited the results of a survey showing that the ratio of male
to female applicants was 9 to 1. Another survey revealed that 95% of the
applicants allegedly came from a remote part of China for which the Immigration Department has no maps. Many allege to have been born on the same
day of the same month, e.g., 2d day of the 2d month, 4th day of the 4th month,
etc. For an interesting discussion concerning such Chinese applicants, see Mar
Gong v. McGranery, 109 F. Supp. 821 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
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others recently decided,1 9 is a distinct advance in the development of
the law.
The Immigration Department, as a governmental agency, has a
dual purpose. It must correctly decide the case as between the litigants, and further, its determination must subserve the public interest,
which it is charged with protecting.20 It is for the latter reason that
such administrative agencies have not been held bound by the strict
rules of evidence. 2 ' Since it is their duty to investigate, they should
be free to receive both judicially competent and incompetent evidence.
Nevertheless, in receiving hearsay evidence in the nature of blood test
results, the relators are entitled to due process. It would therefore
appear that the limitations imposed by the Lee Kum Hoy and Dong
Wing Ott cases are justifiable and necessary implementations of the
"fair play" concept of the due process clause.

ANTI-TRusT-CoNscIous PARALLELISM-INSUFFIClENT BASIS
FOR DIRECTED VEWICT.-Plaintiff, a motion picture exhibitor in suburban Baltimore, brought an action against defendants, moving picture producers and distributors, for violation of the anti-trust laws.'
In moving for a directed verdict, plaintiff contended that defendants
uniformly refused plaintiff the privilege of showing "first-run" pictures, and restricted such exhibits to downtown Baltimore theatres.
No direct evidence of an illegal agreement was shown. The same
defendants had previously been adjudicated guilty of conspiracy under
the anti-trust laws.2 The Supreme Court, in affirming a denial of
the motion, held that consciously parallel business behavior, even
taken in conjunction with the prior adverse decrees, is not conclusive
proof of a conspiracy in violation of the anti-trust laws. Theatre
Enterprises,Inc. v. ParamountFilm Distributing Corp., 74 Sup. Ct.
257 (1954).
Conspiracy, at common law, has generally been defined as an
agreement by two or more persons to do an unlawful act, or to do a
lawful act by unlawful means.3 In anti-trust litigation, however, the
19 See Wong Yoke Sing v. Dulles, 116 F. Supp. 9 (E.D.N.Y. 1953) ; Chin
Kwong
Hing v. Dulles, Civil No. 14,980-HW, S.D. Cal., Oct. 5, 1953.
20
See DAvIs, AD)mNIsTRVIm LAW 453 (1951).
21 Ibid.
126 STAT. 209, 210 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 15 (1946) (Sherman Act: made

criminal any conspiracy in restraint of interstate commerce and allowed treble
damages to parties injured thereby); 38 STAT. 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 26
(1946) (Clayton Act: granted injunctive relief to interested parties).
2 See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
3See Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 203 (1893); Common-

